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Why Civil Law Countries Might Forego the Individual Trustee: Provocative Insights from
the New-to-the-Fold, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST (ed. L. Smith), Cambridge
University Press, 2012 (forthcoming)
At the center of this article lies a decision in several civil law countries that have adopted
the common law trust to restrict the office of trustee to banks and similar financial service
institutions. Having had an opportunity to consider the trust anew, these countries represent a
challenge to the common law where the individual – indeed the untutored individual – can still
qualify as trustee (and serve in this capacity alone). This permissive common law regime obtains
notwithstanding the size of the trust endowment or the number of beneficiaries whose interests
might be at stake. Indeed, in some common law countries individuals can qualify as trustee not
only of a personal trust (for transmission of family wealth), but also of a pension trust holding
assets under a retirement plan sponsored by a large employer, or even of an indenture for holders
of significant corporate debt. While it may be a rare individual who would be nominated to
serve in these latter situations, nothing in the law directly precludes an individual from
qualifying as sole trustee of even these trusts.
That an untutored individual can still qualify as trustee in common law jurisdictions is
especially interesting considering the movement over the last thirty years, spearheaded by the
American academic bar,1 to bring about a doctrinal reformation in the law of trusts and otherwise
propel the trust into the modern era. One of the larger themes in this multi-faceted movement
has been to recognize the trust in its essential identity as an investment vehicle, whether it is used
as an instrument of commerce or for family wealth transmission. Part and parcel of this effort to
usher the trust into the modern era has been the professionalization of the office of trustee.
Nevertheless, scant attention has been paid in this literature to whom or what type of entity
should be able to qualify as trustee. Rather, the effort to professionalize the office has largely
centered on the duties incumbent upon the fiduciary (and, further, the status of these
requirements as mandatory or default rules). And there is no doubt that evolving standards for
the investing of trust assets coupled with widening discretion in choosing appropriate vehicles is
to the uninitiated a powerful caveat. But the question raised for common law jurisdictions
remains: If the goal is to professionalize the office of trustee, why continue to allow the
untutored individual to qualify and, moreover, serve alone?
The decision by these civil law countries to preclude the individual from serving is
provocative in deeper ways as well – ways that implicate fundamental aspects of this effort at
doctrinal reformation by common law academics. While little attention has been paid in this
literature to the prerequisites of the fiduciary office, the movement to see the trust into the
1

If lead by the American academy, it was embraced in other jurisdictions. Regarding the change
in the fiduciary standard of care from Prudent Man to Prudent Investor, for the history of the
American doctrine, see, e.g., Stewart Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is
Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2009). For the similar Canadian
doctrine, see DONOVAN W.M. WATERS ET AL., WATERS’ LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 950-53 (3d
ed. 2005).
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modern era has hardly been neutral with respect to whom or what entity might be selected as
trustee. In fact, at some level, this movement has lent new vitality to the individual trustee.
Beyond the effort to secure the identity of the trust as an investment vehicle, this literature has
set about to recover for the trust its historic role as a vehicle of innovation under the common
law, in any era a device that can circumvent – even subvert – onerous and possibly dysfunctional
aspects of the property regime. 2 To secure the trust in this historic dimension, this literature has
sought to recast the weight of much legal authority away from the prevailing view, first, that the
trust was an institution founded in property (so that the constitutive act was the transfer of assets
from the property-holder to the trustee) and, second and as a corollary to the first, that the
essential rules incumbent upon the trustee were mandatory rules. 3 This literature has offered
instead a view of the trust as a creature of contract such that the constitutive act is an agreement
between the settlor and the trustee and, again with a corollary as to the status of the rules, that
virtually all the fundamental precepts of fiduciary duty are default rules, to be embraced or not as
per the settlor’s agreement with the trustee. In this way, the trust is to be reinvigorated as a
flexible and innovative device for the transfer and administration of property as the settlor
exercises wide discretion in crafting trust terms.
But this new rubric harbors an implication with respect to the choice of a trustee: if the
settlor is to exercise his freedom of contract to create a trust consistent with his preferences
(potentially opening new avenues with respect to the stewardship of property), he must have a
counter-party for whom his terms are congenial. In short, if the settlor is to craft the trust as he
sees fit, he needs broad discretion in selecting a trustee. But further, as it works out, the
magnitude of this discretion – and the potential for innovation -- is likely to be larger if the
settlor contracts with an individual trustee. As between an individual and a bank or other
financial services institution, the settlor’s latitude in negotiating trust terms is almost certainly
greater with an individual trustee as a counter-party. Because financial services institutions are
enmeshed in a regulatory framework that operates with an eye to the overall health of the
institution as well as the larger banking sector, such institutions tend to be risk-averse, looking
over their shoulders for that court that would adhere to some precept drawn from the regime of
mandatory rules, however the trust terms might invoke a different rubric. For this reason, banks
and other financial services institutions often decline to serve as trustee where an agreement
contains innovative terms, insisting instead on trust terms that, absent doctrinal reformation,
align with rules long believed mandatory. From the settlor’s perspective, where the terms of the
trust are particularly innovative, the individual trustee winds up being not merely a choice, but a
preferable one.
Securing this core capacity for innovation by reliance upon the individual trustee comes
at a price, however. And it is this cost that is brought to the fore by statutes in these civil law
countries that eliminate the individual trustee. Allowing the settlor to name an individual as
trustee jeopardizes trust property by potentially subjecting it to the unprepared or unscrupulous.
And while the risk attendant upon the settlor’s discretion might be mitigated where the
beneficiary can recover against the trustee upon breach of fiduciary duty, the potential for
recovery is mitigated by the possibility (especially in the case of the individual trustee) that an
2
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errant trustee does not have the resources to make the trust whole. If banks and other financial
institutions are embedded in a regulatory apparatus, that apparatus is calculated to ensure capital
resources against which an aggrieved beneficiary can recover.
But those civil law countries that allow only a bank or similar financial service institution
to qualify also pay a price. If there is a trade-off between capacity for innovation and security of
trust assets, what adopting jurisdictions gain in predictability and institutionalized accountability
by restricting the fiduciary office to regulated entities must be set off against lost flexibility in a
vehicle for the management of wealth for which flexibility is a primary appeal. While there is an
increased likelihood of recovery against the errant trustee where the trustee is a regulated entity,
such a regime effectively becomes a creature of mandatory rules and the trusts that emerge from
it will almost inevitably be formulaic. Any innovation with respect to the trust itself must then
emanate from the state regulatory authority, as the initiative of private individuals is rendered
nugatory. But further, when the donor’s options in drafting trust terms are limited, the trust loses
that historic potential, where aspects of the property regime have grown untimely, to draw upon
individual initiative to challenge and indeed circumvent dysfunctional elements.
This article has three parts. Part I centers on the common law requirements for
undertaking the office of trustee and focuses on the fundamental rules and doctrines that are
constitutive of the fiduciary office. This inquiry lays the groundwork to appreciate the hold that
the individual trustee continues to exert over the common law imagination. Part II turns to laws
recently adopted in certain civil law jurisdictions that preclude the individual from qualifying
and instead require a bank or other regulated entity serve in the office. This resistance to the
individual trustee is considered against the background of an historical distaste for the trust in the
civil law. Part III returns to the common law and surveys aspects of the American literature of
doctrinal reformation where the permissive posture of the common law with respect to the
individual trustee stands unchallenged. This literature of reform indicates that there are deep
normative biases in the common law that underpin the continued vitality of the individual trustee
there.

Part I: The Common Law Requirements of the Fiduciary Office
The hold that the individual trustee exerts over the common law imagination has
historical roots and survives into this era in doctrines that remain constitutive of the fiduciary
office. To qualify as a common law trustee, the candidate must have two fundamental legal
capacities. First, the would-be fiduciary needs to be capable of the full sweep of legal agency
attendant upon fee simple ownership. Second, the trustee must be of a character such that he can
be responsive in equity.
a. Fundamental requirements of the common law fiduciary office.
Owner in fee simple. Under the common law, the trust itself has never been deemed a
legal person and, accordingly, the trust (as distinct from the trustee) has never been able to

3
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effectuate any legal act.4 Indeed, as the trust has developed under the common law, the entire
edifice came to hang on the legal persona of the trustee and, specifically, his capacity to act with
respect to the property as a fee simple owner. For this reason, the common law has demanded
that the would-be occupant of the fiduciary office meet several requirements calculated to ensure
the officeholder the full sweep of legal agency attendant upon fee simple ownership.5 These
requirements appear in all the common law commentaries but they are perhaps most concisely
put forth in the American treatises. For example, both Bogert and Scott summarize these
fundamental necessities in a threefold requisite for the office6: First, with respect to any property
that is to be transferred into the trust, the would-be trustee must be able to take title; second,
assuming title can pass, this candidate must be able to hold the title that has been received; and
third, going forward, the would-be trustee must be able to administer the property in the trust.7
At a practical level, these distinctions, first between taking title and holding it and then
between holding title and administering the property, seem needlessly subtle. But these three
requisites of the office speak to doctrines and statutes from diverse areas of the law that govern
aspects of legal capacity integral to exercising the legal agency entailed in fee simple ownership.
They also reflect the nuanced view that the law takes with respect to legal capacity for some
persons. For example, neither infants8 nor the insane9 have been able to qualify as trustee

4

While the trustee may be a corporate entity, the transfer of property in trust to a trustee–be it an
individual or a corporation–does not create a corporation or any other entity deemed a person
under the law. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY–ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW–
TWO COURSES OF LECTURES (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whitaker eds., 1929).
5
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 125 (3d ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2009).
6
For the requirements under English law, see DAVID J. HAYTON, UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW
RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES art. 13, at 268 (16th ed. 2003) (“Who may be a settlor or
trustee. Every person, male or female, married or unmarried, human or corporate, who has power
to hold and dispose of any legal or equitable estate or interest in property can create a trust in
respect thereof, and can be a trustee thereof.”). For English law, see also JOHN MOWBRAY ET AL.,
LEWIN ON TRUSTS 31 (18th ed. 2008). For Canadian common law, see DONOVAN W.M. WATERS
ET AL., WATERS’ LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 114-15 (3d ed. 2005).
7
MARK L. ASCHER ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 11.1 (5th ed. Supp. 2009); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 32(b) (2003) (“A person who lacks capacity to contract or
make a conveyance . . . cannot serve in a capacity, because such a person cannot properly fulfill
the duties of a fiduciary . . . .”). Of course, there may be additional statutory requirements in any
particular jurisdiction.
8
MARK L. ASCHER ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 11.1.1 (5th ed. Supp. 2009);
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 127 (3d ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2009); DAVID J. HAYTON, UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES 269 (16th ed. 2003); JOHN MOWBRAY ET AL., LEWIN ON TRUSTS 33 (18th ed. 2008).
9
MARK L. ASCHER ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 11.1.2 (5th ed. Supp. 2009); DAVID
J. HAYTON, UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 269 (16th ed.
2003).
4
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because contracts or deeds made such persons can be voided.10 This means that, while an infant
or an insane person can receive and hold property, such a person will inevitably encounter
obstacles in administering this property. At an earlier point in history, aliens could not qualify as
trustee because, while they were able to take title to real property, they could not hold it against
the sovereign.11 Similarly, until the advent of the Married Women’s Property Act, a married
woman could receive property but she could not hold it against her husband (or more
specifically, his creditors).12
Responsive in equity. So much does the legal operation of the trust depend on the legal
persona of the trustee (expressed as a fee simple owner) that the test for the requisite capacity is
whether the trustee can take, hold and administer property for his own benefit. And there’s the
rub. While the edifice of the trust is erected on the trustee’s fee simple capacity to act for his
own benefit, there is an agreement appurtenant to the transfer of property from the settlor to the
trustee stipulating that this agency in all its potential is to be exercised for the benefit of someone
else, the beneficiary. Once this beneficial interest is introduced and made the object of the trust,
erecting this trust on the trustee’s fee simple right would appear to create little else than a ready
instrument of exploitation. 13
The common law provides an antidote, however:14 for the person who would qualify as a
trustee, there is an additional requirement layered on to the necessary capacity in fee simple. As
10

GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 127 (3d ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2009).
11
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 126 (3d ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2009).
12
Of course, even if the person named as trustee does not have capacity to take title, the intended
trust does not fail, but the court will simply appoint someone to serve who can qualify. MARK L.
ASCHER ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 11.1 (5th ed. Supp. 2009); GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 126 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009); JOHN
MOWBRAY ET AL., LEWIN ON TRUSTS 33 (18th ed. 2008); DONOVAN W.M. WATERS ET AL.,
WATERS’ LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 114 (3d ed. 2005).
13
ROBERT A. PEARCE & JOHN STEVENS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND EQUITABLE OBLIGATION 683
(3d ed. 2002).
14
The contemporary legal imagination can conjure up various alternative ways of conceiving the
office of trustee and the relationship between the trustee and the beneficiary, any of which would
avoid or at least mitigate this potential for abuse. For various reasons, alternative formulations
did not materialize when the trust was in its nascence. While the common law could have vested
the beneficiary with a legal right in the trust property, the venerable Frederic Maitland argues
that such a right would almost certainly have had to have been grounded in the contract between
the settlor and the trustee (for which the beneficiary could have been conceived a third-party
beneficiary), but that the common law contract was itself nascent in this period and was thus
limited in ways that precluded founding the trust in the contract. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY–ALSO
THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW–TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 28-30 (A.H. Chaytor &
W.J. Whitaker eds., 1929). In the alternative, the common law could have subjected trustees to
intense, perhaps day-by-day, regulatory scrutiny (something now done in the case of charitable
and pension trusts which exist for important public purposes). But again, in the era in which the
5
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important as is the legal ability to take, hold and administer property in fee simple, the trustee
must also be capable of embracing a standard of meticulous probity anchored in the jurisdiction
of the Court of Equity and the jurisprudence spawned there. In short, to forestall the potential
for abuse, the common law again looks to the trustee, but this time to predicate the trust not
merely on his legal persona, but on his moral persona as well. The common law trustee must not
merely be amenable but, most importantly, he must be susceptible to the subtle supervision of
the court of equity – to be willing and able to exercise his right of fee simple subject to standards
particularly attuned to evaluating the exercise of discretion. The court of equity will supervise
only those that are amenable to its supervision. In this way, the trustee’s fee simple discretion is
not attenuated, but rather any potentially self-serving purposes for which this discretion might be
exercised are redirected, courtesy of the agreement between the settlor and the trustee and
subject to the supervision of the court.15 This equitable oversight gives rise to the beneficiary’s
unique right, one that runs not against the trust property (such as to diminish the trustee’s fee
simple interest), but against the trustee personally.
This requisite moral agency has been famously rendered rhapsodic in the phrase, “a
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”16 Historically, this moral agency has operated as a
categorical disqualification for certain individual candidates whose lives bespoke a lack of
rectitude – like felons and bankrupts. And there are common law jurisdictions that still prohibit
felons from qualifying.17 But even those that do not exclude particular categories of people as
inherently unfit continue to reserve discretion in the court to deny appointment to individuals that
are deemed to be fundamentally unsuitable, including the dishonest, the improvident, and
candidates with other defects of character suggesting that they will not be amenable to equitable
supervision.18
b. Corporations as trustees.
Throughout much of the history of the common law trust, corporations have been unable
to qualify as trustee. The essential attributes deemed to inhere in those individual candidates that
succeeded in qualifying for the fiduciary office – the full sweep of agency attendant on fee
simply ownership together with a capacity to be responsive in equity – were found lacking in
corporations. In the early centuries of the trust, judges refused to allow a corporation to be
trust developed, the apparatus of government was not sufficiently mature to render such
oversight. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY–ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW–TWO
COURSES OF LECTURES 29-30 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whitaker eds., 1929).
15
This requirement of probity is coupled with draconian remedies that operate to deprive a
trustee of any gain made through abuse of his position. See ROBERT A. PEARCE & JOHN STEVENS,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND EQUITABLE OBLIGATION 686 (3d ed. 2002).
16
But within the jurisprudence of equity, this “punctilio of an honor” consists in far more than
mere moral finesse, and has been rendered legally choate in the duties of loyalty and prudence.
See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
17
N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 707(1)(d) (McKinney 2010).
18
N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 707(1)(e) (McKinney 2010); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE §
706 (2006). In addition to the draconian tort remedies (see supra note 15), some abuses,
particularly the misappropriation of trust property, constitute criminal offences. See ROBERT A.
PEARCE & JOHN STEVENS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND EQUITABLE OBLIGATION 685 (3d ed. 2002).
6
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seised to a “use” (the aboriginal common law trust) because, while a corporation could take title
to property, it could not, consistent with its corporate purposes, hold and administer it in trust.
In that event, attempting to do so was inevitably an ultra vires act. As an artificial person in the
law, the corporation had no capacity to act beyond those express objects set forth in its charter
(plus any implied powers incidental to the realization of these express purposes).19 And early in
the history of the corporation purposes tended to be specific and, read narrowly, they precluded
the holding and administering of property in trust. Further, beyond the limitations emanating
from a corporate charter, some judges resisted the idea that a corporation could be responsive in
equity. The corporation was deemed a “dead body” and, as such, could not be made subject to
the in personam jurisdiction of a court of equity. 20
By the eighteenth century, however, judicial rhetoric about the corporation being a “dead
body” with its implications with respect to equitable jurisdiction was set aside. 21 And the
constraints of the narrowly drawn corporate charter were a problem that abated in the late
nineteenth century. At that point a movement emerged to less the legislative strictures on
corporations so that they ceased to be created for stipulated and narrow purposes but the grant of
authority became typically broad.22 Then, whether a corporation had the capacity to hold and
administer property in trust came to turn on whether the trust as per its terms furthered the
purposes of the corporation as per the charter and the essential endeavors undertaken consistent
with the charter (and other constitutive documents).23 So, for example, as the jurisprudence
moved forward here, it was readily apparent that a corporation could, consistent with its
corporate charter, serve as trustee of a trust holding retirement funds or otherwise benefiting
employees.24
c. Fiduciary Regulation.
But even if a broad grant of authority might address per se reservations with respect to
the corporate trustee, in many common law jurisdictions corporate trustees have yet to obtain an
equal footing with the individual trustee when it comes to qualifying for the office. This is
because, a broad grant of authority notwithstanding, corporations remain creatures of legislative
19

DAVID J. HAYTON, UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 27072 (16th ed. 2003).
20
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 131 (3d ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2009).
21
MARK L. ASCHER ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 11.1.6 (5th ed. Supp. 2009).
22
See JAMES D. COX AND THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS (2d ed.)
sections 2.02-2.06.
23
The nature of the property to be held in trust could also present a stumbling block under the
charter of the would-be corporate trustee. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 131 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 33 (2003) (“A corporation has capacity to take and hold property in trust except as
limited by law, and to administer trust property and act as trustee to the extent of the powers
conferred upon it by law.”).
24
Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 33 (Eng.), substituted by Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 108
(Eng.), repealed by Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, sch. 16 (Eng.); DAVID J. HAYTON, UNDERHILL
AND HAYTON: LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 270-72 (16th ed. 2003).
7
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grace and, where a corporation would qualify as trustee, regulatory requirements for the office
potentially overlay those the common law imposes. In some common law jurisdictions this
regulatory authority has been particularly exigent for corporations that would enter into the
business of being a trustee. Indeed, where common law jurisdictions have come to differ quite
significantly is in the degree to which they subject to regulation corporations conducting a
fiduciary business. For these professional corporate trustees, the additional requirements of
office are calculated to ensure solvency as well as other elements of fiduciary integrity -appropriate risk management (including investment of trust assets), custody of assets,
segregation of assets, and liability of bank property with respect to trust losses. 25 Note that,
however reasonable such requirements might be, given the opportunity for abuse inherent in the
trust, individual trustees have never been subjected to such ex ante supervision. Typically in
common law jurisdictions, if individual trustees are supervised at all, it occurs after the fact,
upon breach of fiduciary duty, when the errant trustee is held accountable pursuant to tort
standards by disgruntled beneficiaries either in court or in negotiations occurring under the threat
of litigation.26
Jurisdictions within the U.S. regulate corporations engaging in the business of being a
trustee. In these jurisdictions, such corporations must have “trust powers” which can be acquired
only as a term (express or implied) of a bank or trust company charter.27 Chartering occurs either
at the state or the federal level, but in every instance requires that the institution meet and
maintain certain capital requirements. For banks chartered at the state level, it is the legislature
in the state where the bank has its principal place of business that authorizes the corporation to
enter into the banking business in that state and (if trust powers are sought) to offer fiduciary
services to the public there. States can also charter trust companies.28
Banks can also be chartered at the federal level in the U.S., historically under the Federal
Reserve Act, under which approval could be granted for undertaking trust services (in addition to
banking activities).29 In 1962, this authority was transferred to the Comptroller of the Currency30
25

12 C.F.R. § 9.13(a) (2010) requires that, with respect to each trust account, investments shall
be kept separate from the assets of the bank and shall be placed in the joint custody or control of
the bank with officers in control of these assets adequately bonded.
26
For consideration of this issue in the English context, see Alastair Hudson, The Regulation of
Trustees, in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS LAW163 (Dixon
& Griffiths eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
27
In order to protect the public, it is now often provided by statute that only corporations
authorized to do a trust business can used the words “trust” or “trustee” in their corporate names.
See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 131 (3d ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2009).
28
While state-chartered banks typically offer services as trustee as alongside a larger package of
banking services (checking and savings accounts, lending, investment vehicles, etc.), statechartered trust companies are chartered for the purpose of administering trusts and other
fiduciary relationships with banking services available as ancillary offerings. GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 136 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009).
29
Until 1962, regulatory authority with respect to nationally chartered banks arose under the
Federal Reserve Act of 1913 that, pursuant to Regulation F, authorized national banks to act as
8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1931018

who now promulgates rules and otherwise supervises the exercise of trust powers by national
banks under Regulation 9.31 In exercising trust powers, national banks must segregate trust
property and comply with state regulations regarding the deposit of securities, filing of bond,
etc., so far as these requirements are also laid down for state banks and trust companies in the
state.32 Where conduct is continuously improper, the Comptroller can revoke a national bank’s
authority to provide trust services.33
In the U.S., this regulatory framework has operated to allow banks and state-chartered
trust companies to edge out non-bank corporations that would engage in the business of being a
trustee.34 A well-known exception to this stranglehold can be found in Massachusetts where
corporations – “limited purpose trust companies” – may conduct trust and fiduciary business
where the commissioner of banking is “satisfied that public convenience and advantage will be
promoted and that competition among banking institutions will not be unreasonably affected.”
Other state statutes afford the commissioner of banking or such other state official similar

trustees (among other banking services). Federal Reserve Act of 1913 § 11(k), 12 U.S.C. §
248(k) (1913) (repealed 1962).
30
12 U.S.C.A. § 92a (West 2010); 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.101 (2010) [hereinafter Reg. 9].
31
The provisions of Part 9 are issued under Act of September 28, 1962 § 1, 12 U.S.C.A. § 92a
(West 2010).
32
12 U.S.C.A. § 9(c), (f)-(g) (West 2010). If the laws of the state in which the national bank is
located permit the exercise of trust powers by state banks or trust companies, the granting to and
exercise of a power to act by a national bank is not deemed in contravention of state law.
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 134 (3d ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2009).
33
This can be done without going into court at the state level and asking a court of equity to
remove the trustee. 12 U.S.C.A. § 9(c), (f)-(g) (West 2010).
34
The regulatory framework surrounding the U.S. banking industry has been in flux for two
decades. The goal has been to deregulate the industry “to eliminate statutory and regulatory
barriers that segmented the banking industry between commercial banks and thrift institutions
and that created a noncompetitive environment between these industry segments.” Joseph Jude
Norton, The 1982 Banking Act and the Deregulation Scheme, 38 BUS. LAW 1627, 1627 (1983).
Under the 1980 Omnibus Banking Act, federal savings and loan associations were authorized to
make application to the Federal Home Loan Banking Board to secure trust powers. Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 § 403, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 24 Stat.
132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). A federal savings
and loan association may be authorized to exercise trust and fiduciary powers. See 12 U.S.C.A. §
1464 (West 2010). By § 704 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980, the provision of the national Banking Laws regarding the power of the Comptroller
to revoke trust powers for the unlawful or unsound exercise of powers or for failure to exercise
powers were amended. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 92a (West 2010) (Developments authorizing interstate
banking). Further, savings banks and savings or savings and loan association have recently
become eligible by statute to act as trustees. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 135 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009); see also 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(a) (West
2010).
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discretion, but such authorities in other states are typically unable to satisfy themselves that the
introduction of these non-bank trustees will indeed serve “public convenience and advantage.” 35
In Canada, corporations in the business of being a trustee are also subject to a highly
restrictive regulatory regime, but not via the banking laws. Historically, in Canada neither banks
nor insurance companies have been permitted enter into the business of being a trustee. Instead,
Canada has regulated those corporations that would enter into this business as special purpose
financial companies, institutions peculiar to Canada and known as “trust companies.” These
requirements for corporations that would serve as trustee still obtain. 36 Any Canadian trust
company is subject to the jurisdiction of both federal authorities and those provincial authorities
where the trust company is incorporated.37
Until quite recently, England and Wales have had an exceedingly liberal regulatory
regime where corporate trustees are concerned. In fact, in England and Wales (which are
effectively one regime for purposes of the law of trusts and trustees), there has been no
requirement either of registration or of licensure. A corporation that is neither a bank nor a trust
company has been able to enter into the business of being a trustee of personal trusts for
members of the public without being subject to any regulatory regime. This liberal regime
endures, with the exception of two recent statutory additions -- first, the Financial Services and
Market Act 2000 and, second, the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (Statutory Instrument
2007 No 2157). The Financial Services Act introduces only modest burdens into the enduring
liberal regime. First, the 2000 Act applies only to a trustee that engages in investing, requiring
that this trustee be authorized to undertake this activity and then be subject to a regulatory regime
administered by the Financial Services Authority (which is created under this Act).38 This
statute would appear to apply to virtually any professional trustee, as any professional trustee
effectively holds itself out as offering investment management as part and parcel of being a
professional trustee. Nevertheless, a corporate trustee can avoid the 2000 Act if it does not hold
itself out as offering investment services and does not receive remuneration for investment
services in addition to fees charged for serving as trustee. What must be avoided is seeking to
draw business to the corporation by advertising expertise in investments. And the second
exception may be satisfied if the corporate fiduciary only takes its fees as a percentage of assets
under management.39

35

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 172, § 9A (West 2010).
DONOVAN W.M. WATERS ET AL., WATERS’ LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 119-20 (3d ed. 2005).
Regulatory changes and market pressure in recent years have resulted in discretionary fiduciary
services being provided primarily by trust companies that are subsidiaries of banks. Independent
trust companies, while still an important part of the market for discretionary fiduciary services,
are much less significant than they were in the past.
37
DONOVAN W.M. WATERS ET AL., WATERS’ LAW OF TRUSTS IN CANADA 119-20 (3d ed. 2005).
38
The specific language is “deals in investments or arranges deals in investments or manages
investment or safeguards and administers assets belonging to another . . . .” Financial Services
and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (Eng.).
39
See DAVID J. HAYTON, UNDERHILL AND HAYTON: LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
271-72 (17th ed. Supp. 2009). For consideration of this issue in the English context, see Alastair
36
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The 2007 Money Laundering Regulations require only that a corporate trustee register
with Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs, an agency that has discretion to reject entities deemed
at risk with respect to money laundering activities or terrorist financing. The 2007 Act can also
be satisfied by registering with the Financial Services Authority created under the Financial
Services & Markets Act 2000 (treated in the preceding paragraph). The Regulations impose due
diligence measures, monitoring and record keeping requirements, all of which facilitate the
monitoring of sources and recipients of funds.
d. Continued appeal of the individual trustee under the common law.
The common law fiduciary office was developed on the legal persona of the individual.
But if at some point the common law doctrines governing the fiduciary office matured in such as
way as to permit the corporation to qualify, the individual trustee has in no way been legally
jettisoned or even side-lined in the course of these changes. There are multi-layered reasons that
the individual trustee endures in common law jurisdictions and the deepest of these will be
addressed in Part III of this article. At this juncture, however, suffice it to note that, for certain
settlors, because the corporate trustee is almost certain to be regulated ex ante, 40 the appeal of
the individual trustee has endured. While regulation ex ante may remove certain risks to
beneficiaries (particularly the risk of the insolvent trustee),41 settlors attracted to the flexibility of
the trust and seeking wide discretion in crafting trust terms often have reason, when choosing a
trustee, to avoid financial services institutions enmeshed in a regulatory framework.42 When
asked to serve under trust agreements with innovative terms, such institutions tend to be riskaverse and fear liability with respect to duties considered (by some lights) to inhere in the office
even where the trust agreement, consistent with innovative terms, directs otherwise.43 In the
individual trustee, the common law continues to afford the settler a comparatively free hand and,
as we shall see in Part III, secures the long-standing innovative potential of the trust where
fundamental property norms are concerned.

Hudson, The Regulation of Trustees, in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY, EQUITY
AND TRUSTS LAW163 (Dixon & Griffiths eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
40
Certain common law jurisdictions have of late seen the advent of trust companies that are
exempt from regulation (In the United States, these are state-chartered entities). These new
entities are not addressed in the body of this article because, as they are restricted to serving only
a related group of people, they remain a relatively minor phenomenon and, further, their appeal
to settlers validates the larger argument of this piece. In establishing a “family trust company,”
settlers are seeking to use the corporate form to minimize the liability of the trustee without
losing the discretion that the unregulated individual trustee has long afforded the settler. See Iris
J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure a Family
Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 467 (2010).
41
Carol Harrington & Ryan M. Harding, Private Trust Companies and Family Offices: What
Every Estate Planner Needs to Know, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING EDUC., Sept. 4-5, 2008, at 689,
available at SP020 ALI-ABA 675.
42
See Iris J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure a
Family Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 467 at 487-88 (2010).
43
See infra Part III.d.
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Part II: The civil law trustee
In contrast to the common law where the individual remains the quintessential trustee,
civil law jurisdictions that have adopted the common law trust over the last sixty or so years
evidence a clear preference not merely for the corporate trustee, but a corporate trustee subject to
regulation ex ante, such as a bank or insurance company. But to the extent that this apparent
distaste for the individual trustee might constitute a challenge to the common law, it is instructive
to locate this civil law preference in the context of the longstanding and quite fundamental
ideological discomfort with the trust.
a. Historical Discomfort.
As a prelude to considering the particulars of the civil law challenge to the common law on
the point of the individual trustee, it is worth noting that for centuries now the civil law has
exhibited considerable discomfort with the trust itself. In particular, the civil law has shown
discomfort with bifurcated ownership as well as the attendant successive beneficial substitutions
that commonly occur within any property settlement (like the trust) lasting multiple decades. 44
This article suggests that, where the choice of a trustee is concerned, any civil law predilection
for an entity regulated ex ante bespeaks a continuing discomfort with the trust in general, a
discomfort that bespeaks certain core principles embedded in the civil law, especially with
respect to property. These ideas came to the fore in the legal reforms of the French Revolution,
ideas that, in the wake of the Revolution, were exported via the Code Napoleon, first to
European countries occupied by the French during the Revolution and later to regions throughout
the world as these areas were subjected to colonial rule by European countries.
Whether the civil law could have ultimately produced an institution equivalent to the
common law trust remains a matter of some controversy. 45 There is no doubt that, with a binary
judicial system, England provided especially fertile ground for the realization of this particular
institution in all its vitality. The dual judicial apparatus of common law courts standing side-byside with courts of equity made for two distinct forms of pleadings, each ultimately recognizing
two distinct but coextensive types of ownership embedded in the trust.46 Nevertheless, under the
Roman law (the precursor to the civil law in Continental Europe), there did emerge certain
agency relationships and other types of transfers similar at least to the common law trust in its
early, medieval guise. Like the nascent common law trust, these Roman law strategems operated
44

This discomfort is of a piece with the legendary early twentieth century story where the
illustrious common law scholar Frederic Maitland attempted to explain the trust to the equally
illustrious civil law scholar Otto von Gierke only to have the great German jurist confess that the
idea still made no sense to him. Maitland recounts the story and clearly takes it to be evidence of
the uniqueness of the trust, a validation of the trust as a quintessentially common law institution.
F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY–ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW–TWO COURSES OF
LECTURES 23-24 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whitaker eds., 1929).
45
For a subtle view of the civil law tradition, see Vera Bolgar, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law?,
2 AM. J. COMP. L. 204 (1953); see also F. WEISER, TRUSTS ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE
(1936).
46
NICOLAS MALUMIAN, TRUSTS IN LATIN AMERICA xxvi (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
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as measures of limited application, devised to circumvent laws limiting disposition at death or
(with respect to the Roman law in particular) to navigate idiosyncratic circumstances not
contemplated within the governing legal rubrics. For example, under the Roman
fideicommissum,47 if a transfer to a particular donee was proscribed (such as a transfer to a
foreigner), a donor could make the transfer instead to a third party with a direction to convey the
property at the donor’s death to the designated recipient.48 Of course, consistent with the
primitive simplicity of this particular finesse, the intended recipient of the property had no legal
recourse in the event the property was not delivered.49
None of these Roman law strategems ever developed sufficiently as a legal institution to
invite – like the mature common law trust -- the management of significant wealth over an
extended period on behalf of diverse legal interests with respect to the assets. Nevertheless, by
the eighteenth century, the French aristocracy had made the most of a stratagem akin to the
Roman fideicommissum, what in this later era was termed the substitution fideicommissaire – a
gift to one person with an understanding that he convey it to a third -- to entail property over
multiple generations. But as the French often employed the substitution, the initial transferee
had ceased to be a strawman (as was the case with the Roman law fideicommissum), but was a
bonafide recipient in his own right – at least for his lifetime. Typically, the paterfamilias
transferred his patrimony to his eldest son on condition that the son transfer it to his firstborn son
and so on. The nobility used the substitution in this way to sustain the institution of
primogeniture, ensuring thereby that wealth remained concentrated in aristocratic hands.
Whether the substitution would have continued to develop into something akin to the fullblown common law trust is hard to know. With the French Revolution, substitutions (and by
implication, similar institutions such as the common law trust) became anathema in the civil law.
In 1792 the Legislative Assembly prohibited such arrangements as undermining the pursuit of
equality throughout the larger body politic. 50 To ensure the appropriate legal underpinnings to a
bourgeois republic, the Revolution put in place a property regime in which transparency with
respect to title was key. Ownership was co-extensive with the legal interest of that person who
had an immediate right to the asset (for example, to be on the land).51 The simplicity of this
regime ensured that someone was always legally empowered to transfer the property and,
further, that this person was readily discoverable. Land could come into the stream of commerce
47

WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND & BARON A.D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW173 et seq,
(1952)
48
In a similar vein were the fiducia and the pactum fidiuciae. In the case of the fiducia there was
actually a transfer of property to a party who had an obligation (based on trust) to transfer the
property to a third party after of a period of time had passed or a condition was met. See
WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND & BARON A.D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 177 (1952).
49
WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND & BARON A.D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW (1952).
50
The Civil Code codified the proscription at Article 896. See RICHARD HYLAND, GIFTS ¶¶ 44850 (2009). As Hyland notes, there were a number of exceptions. Id.; see also Paul Matthews, The
French Fiducie: And Now for Something Completely Different?, 21 TR. L. INT’L, no. 1, 2007, at
17.
51
Cultural Variations on Property Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ¶ 10
(1978).
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where it could change hands frequently like any other asset. The new property regime fostered
equality by quite literally cutting the ground from feudalism. 52
When the Code Napoleon was drafted, this prohibition against substitution (with the
attendant distaste for the common law trust) deeply informed the precepts of law promulgated
there. This attitude was exported to countries occupied by the French during the Napoleonic
Wars. Influence spread further as French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies around the world
tracked the French canons in drafting their own codes at independence. Finally, the influence of
the Code Napoleon became virtually global as modernizing non-Western countries with little
historical connection to Continental Europe – indeed, some of them former British colonies53 -modeled their statutes on the civil law. At a premium in these modernizing countries has been a
legal system characterized by lucid precepts solidly grounded in the legitimating provenance of a
democratically-elected legislature. Such nascent polities could scarcely afford the luxury of a
legal system such as the historic common law, maturing by accretion over decades, even
centuries, as judges layered one nuanced, fact-intensive holding upon another. In these
jurisdictions this quest for legal simplicity further militated against the trust, a creature of
seeming legal contradictions, a rich stew of apparent incompatibles predicated upon the
competing jurisdictions of law and equity.
b. The trust nevertheless.
Whatever civil law norms with respect to the institution of property might be, however, from
early in the twentieth century, civil law jurisdictions have struggled to reconcile the essential
elements of the trust with these fundamental principles as a first step to assimilating this
quintessential common law institution. 54 Any discomfort with the trust notwithstanding, in the
twentieth century civil law jurisdictions began to discern its significant utility. First, while there
are a few essential rights and obligations with respect to property that must be present for a
structure to do be deemed a trust, few devices for holding and administering property are so
flexible as to form as the trust. In establishing a trust, a settlor has enormous discretion in
formulating managerial duties and creating beneficial rights. And as modern economies saw
increasingly sophisticated forms of intangible property, this flexibility made the trust an
attractive device to hold such interests, for purposes of making intra-family transfers of wealth
but also for myriad other purposes. Indeed, in a significant number of civil law jurisdictions, the
trust became an expedient to utilize in securitizing certain assets, making it a vehicle for the
creation of such complex financial instruments.55 Second, if the requisites to formation are
minimal, once the trust is formed, its terms are almost impossible to change (absent authority in
the contract or application to court or some supervisory authority). Such legal barriers to
reformation offer settlors assurance of desired outcomes, especially for any trust the object of
which can be realized only over an extended period of time. The trust thus stands in marked
52

RICHARD HYLAND, GIFTS ¶¶ 448-50 (2009).
See infra Part II.a.
54
The history of the reception varied jurisdiction by jurisdiction. With respect to Mexico, see,
e.g., Roberto Molina Pasquel, The Mexican Fideicomiso: The Reception, Evolution and Present
Status of the Common Law Trust in a Civil Law Country, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 54 (1969).
55
NICOLAS MALUMIAN, TRUSTS IN LATIN AMERICA ch. 3 “Securitization” (Oxford Univ. Press
2009).
53

14

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1931018

contrast to the corporation where the imprimatur of the state is a prerequisite to formation and
many terms (such as certain shareholders’ rights) can be required. And once a corporation is
established, corporate boards can have a much freer hand in altering corporate purposes.
Of course, the challenge for these jurisdictions has been, without positing the concurrent
jurisdictions of law and equity or otherwise relying on judicial nuance, to draw together into one
legal rubric the nexus of very minimal but altogether essential interests and obligations with
respect to property that together make the trust. The civil law has struggled, without violating its
fundamental principle with respect to unity of title, to render a legal account of the authority of
the trustee holding and disposing of property subject to terms stipulated by the transferor, terms
that typically vest beneficiaries with rights with respect to trust property. (Indeed, in this vein
beneficiaries must be able to hold trustees accountable for misapplied assets and in particular
they must be legally empowered to pursue trust property which has been transferred in breach of
trust.) Further, this empowerment of the trustee must be expressed in such a way as not to
jeopardize the autonomy of the trust estate: the property conveyed to the trustee must somehow
be rendered legally secure from both the creditors of the trustee (notwithstanding the status of the
trustee as owner) and the creditors of the settlor (notwithstanding the settlor’s stipulations in the
foundational document).
The civil law has made numerous attempts to articulate these rudimentary requirements in a
legal idiom consistent with its core values. First, in the early twentieth century, civil law jurists
resorted to age-old civil law ideas and tried to cognize the trust as an agency relationship – a
modern fideicommissum. Unfortunately, while this idea captured the obligation to manage the
trust estate in accordance with the settlor’s terms, it failed to clarify who actually owned the
property. Also, if the trust was to be understood as a conventional agency relationship so that the
trustee remained subject to the settlor after the conveyance, this formulation jeopardized the
autonomy of the trust estate, especially with respect to the settlor’s creditors.56 Later civil law
jurists characterized the trust as an entity in the law, like the corporation. Unfortunately, while
this characterization secured the autonomy of the trust estate, it also rendered the trust a creature
of the state, inviting regulation and even regimentation. Still others simply tried to bite the bullet
and concede that the trust entailed a twofold ownership – “juridical ownership” in the trustee and
“economic ownership” in the beneficiary. While this characterization empowered beneficiaries
to secure and defend their interest in the trust estate, it flew in the face of the principle of unitary
ownership. To date, perhaps the most successful attempt to characterize the trust consistent with
fundamental precepts of the civil law has tempered technical legal terminology with metaphor,
describing the trust as a “special-purpose patrimony.” The term captures the status of the trustee
as owner of the trust property at the same time as, in the idea of an inherent “special purpose,” it
tips its hat to the interests of beneficiaries created in the settlor’s stipulations at conveyance. The
idea of a special purpose also lays the groundwork for securing the trust estate vis-à-vis the
trustee’s creditors. If the devil is in the details, however, the idea of a special purpose patrimony
provides only the broad outlines within which the real work must ensue.57
56

Also, as an agency relationship, the fideicommissum would not survive the settlor’s death. See
NICOLAS MALUMIAN, TRUSTS IN LATIN AMERICA 184 (Oxford University Press 2009).
57
For a critique, see Paul Matthews, The French Fiducie: And Now for Something Completely
Different?, 21 TR. L. INT’L, no. 1, 2007, at 17.
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c. Who or What Can Serve.
In civil law jurisdictions adopting the trust, the trustee is no less an essential element of the
institution than it has been under the common law.58 If the trust is not to be deemed an entity in
the law, then the institution has to be developed around the office of the fiduciary. And a
significant cohort of these civil law jurisdictions has precluded the individual trustee from
qualifying. These jurisdictions restrict the office of trustee to an entity regulated ex ante.
Of all the regions comprised of civil law countries, none has so embraced the common
law trust as has Latin America. In 1932 Mexico became the first Latin American jurisdiction to
adopt the common law trust, “el fideicomiso.”59 After Mexico adopted the trust, the institution
migrated south over subsequent decades to be adopted by other Latin American countries.
If Mexico adopted the common law trust, however, this country nevertheless repudiated
the individual trustee. Indeed, in Mexico, the fiduciary must be an authorized institucion
fiduciaria. Perhaps because, as in most Latin American jurisdictions, the trust is used primarily
in financial operations and real estate matters, institucions fiduciarias are limited to credit
institutions, insurance companies and similar entities regulated ex ante. Of these, credit
institutions have the broadest purchase, while insurance companies can qualify only with respect
to trusts whose object is related to their corporate purposes. Where guarantee trusts are
concerned, almost any of these fiduciary entities can serve, as can general depositaries and credit
unions. 60

58

Note that we are not concerned here with those civil law jurisdictions that have adopted the
trust in order to develop an offshore trust business, to offer a tax haven and potentially asset
protection for non-citizen non-residents. We are concerned instead with those civil law
jurisdictions that have introduced the trust so that it can be used by their own citizens in ordering
their affairs. We are also not concerned with countries (such as Italy) that have accepted the trust
into the property regime not by introducing specific legislation but rather by ratifying the Hague
Convention and recognizing the trust as a consequence, so that citizens who with Italian-situs
property establish trusts pursuant to foreign law then benefit from the choice-of-law provisions
under Article 11 of the Convention. For Italy, see MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 368 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). For the Hague Convention, see Hague Convention on
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, July 1, 1985, 23 I.L.M. 1389 (with entry into force January 1, 1992),
available at http://www.hcch.net (Full text of the convention, including a complete list of
countries that ratified it of the members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law).
59
The 1932 Securities and Credit Transactions General Act (Ley General de Titulos y
Operaciones de Credito) arts. 346-59 under the heading of Del fideicomiso, which was
developed under the influence of the jurists Ricardo Alfaro and Pierre Lepaulle. See Roberto
Molina Pasquel, The Mexican Fideicomiso: The Reception, Evolution and Present Status of the
Common Law Trust in a Civil Law Country, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 54, 57-67 (1969).
60
Ley General de Títulos y Operationces de Crédito [LIC] [General Law for Securities and
Credit Operations] c. V, art. 350, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 1932 (Mex.).
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After Mexico adopted the common law trust, the institution moved south in guises of
various degrees of similarity. 61 Colombia adopted the trust in 1941 and there only trust
companies can be trustees. These trust companies be authorized by the superintendent of
banking to undertake the role of fiduciary and must be engaged solely in the business of being
trustee.62 In Honduras, where the trust was adopted in 1950, trustees also must be authorized
banking institutions.63 Venezuela adopted the trust in 1956 and allows only banking institutions
and insurance companies to be trustees.64 Guatemala put in place a statute permitting trust to be
created in 1970 but permits to qualify as trustee only Guatemalan banks, credit institutions, and
those private investment companies authorized by the Junta Monetaria. 65 In El Salvador,
adopted the trust in the same year and requires that a trustee be either a bank or authorized credit
institution. 66 Bolivia adopted the trust in 1977 and there only banks can be trustees.67
Ecuador put in place legislation authorizing the trust in 1993, restricting the office of
trustee to fund and trust management companies with the state bank and the National Finance
Corporation also permitted to qualify. 68 Peru adopted the trust in 1996 and opened the office to a
variety of banking institutions. A state-owned financial institution, the Corporacion Financiera
de Desarrollo, can qualify, as can banking companies, financial companies, municipal savings
and credit banks, municipal people’s credit banks, entities for the development of small- and
micro-sized companies and credit cooperatives authorized to raise resources from the public,
rural savings and credit banks, exchange services companies and funds transfer companies,
fiduciary services companies (corporations that have as sole object and activity to be trustees),
and insurance companies.69 Finally, Paraguay adopted the trust the same year as Peru and
permits to qualify as trustee only banks and corporations organized for the exclusive purpose of
being trustees and authorized by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 70
On the European Continent, Luxembourg introduced the contrat fiduciare into law in
1983. The office of trustee is limited to banks.72
71

61

NICOLAS MALUMIAN, TRUSTS IN LATIN AMERICA 19 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
CODIGO DE COMERCIO [C. COM.] tit. IX, art. 1226 (Colum.).
63
Ley de la Comision National de Bancos y Seguros (Decree No. 155/95) (Hond.).
64
Trust Law (1956) art. 12 (Venez.).
65
CODIGA COMERCIA c. 5, §§ 766-793 (Guat.); Financial Supervision Decree No. 18-2002
(Guat.).
66
CODIGA COMERCIA §§ 1233 et seq. (El Sal.); Ley de Bancos § 67 et seq. (El. Sal.).
67
CODIGA COMERCIA tit. VII, c. IV, § 11, arts. 1409-1427 (Bol.); Ley de Bancos y Entidodes
Financieros arts. 3, 9 (Bol.); Circular SB/254/93 (Jul. 12, 1993) (Bol.).
68
Securities Market Act (No. 367/1998) (Ecuador); Decree No. 390 (No. 87/1998) Law No. 107
(Ecuador).
69
Ley General de Instituciones Bancarias, Financieras v. de Seguros (No. 770/1993), sub-ch. IX,
art. 315 (Ecuador).
70
Fiduciary Transactions Act (Law No. 921/1996) and Resolution No. 6 (Nov. 22, 2004) (Para.);
(Law No. 861/96) §§ 40, 73 (Para.).
71
MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 281 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
72
Grand Ducal decree of 19 July 1983 art. 1 (Lux.).
62
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Quite recently, in 2007, the wellspring of the code Napoleon, France, amended its civil
code to introduce the fiducie. Significantly, the French fiducie is quite restricted in its
application, both in the creation of a trust and in filling the office of trustee. Individuals and
partnerships cannot settle a trust, but only corporations subject to the corporation tax can create a
fiducie. Further, only banks and insurance companies can be trustees.73 These restrictions would
seemingly bespeak an enduring discomfort with substitutions – and the trust -- in France. 74
d. Exceptions.
There are exceptions, however. Not every civil law jurisdiction adopting the trust has
rejected the individual trustee. In these cases, however, even if the legal regime is at base a civil
law regime, each of these jurisdictions has in some way been subject to common law influence
that has been especially resonant with respect to the trust. For example, some of these
jurisdictions were once British or American colonies. Belize (known as British Honduras in the
colonial era)75 and Panama (where U.S. domination began in the early years of the twentieth
century) 76 are civil law countries that allow the individual to qualify as trustee. Israel discovered
the trust in 1924, during the British mandate, and permits an individual to can qualify as
trustee.77 South Africa can also be added to this list of former colonies that have adopted the
trust and embrace the individual trustee.78
Other civil law jurisdictions that allow the individual to qualify as trustee either are presently
or have in the past been semi-autonomous regions within common law countries. Both Scotland
(governed by Roman-Scots law, a regime with deep ties to the legal tradition of Continental
Europe) 79 and Quebec80 fit this description. Louisiana with a legal regime closely connected to

73

Loi 2007-211 du 19 février 2007 instituant la fiducie [Law 2007-211 of February 19, 2007
establishing trust], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANḉAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Feb. 19, 2007, art. 2051.
74
See Paul Matthews, The French Fiducie: And Now for Something Completely Different?, 21
TR. L. INTERNAT’L, no. 1, 2007, at 17.
75
Trusts Act, pt. 1, § 17 (1992) (Belize).
76
Trust Law (No. 1/1984) (Pan.); Executive Decree (No. 16/1984) (Pan.); see also Ricardo J.
Alfaro, The Trust and the Civil Law with Special Reference to Panama, 33 J. LEGIS. & INT’L L.
25 (3d Ser. No. 2, 1951); see also MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 285
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
77
Trust Law, 5739-1979, ch. 2, § 21 (1979) (Isr.). For compensation, see Trust Law, 5739-1979,
ch. 1, § 8(a) (Isr.); see also MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 279-80
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
78
Trust Property Control Act 55 of 1988 § 1 (as amended) (S. Afr.).
79
Trusts (Scotland) Act, 1961; Law Reform (Scotland) Act, 1968; see also R. Evans-Jones, Civil
Law in the Scottish Legal Tradition, in CIVIL LAW TRADITION IN SCOTLAND passim (1995); D.M.
WALTER, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SCOTLAND, EDINBURGH 1988-95 (1996); R. Burgess, Thoughts
on the Origins of the Trust in Scots Law, JUR. REV. 196 (1974).
80
The trust finally entered the Quebec civil code in 1994 on the heels of a great controversy as to
whether the trust in its quintessential aspects could be assimilated consistent with civil law
property principles (as per the Napoleonic Code). Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1994, art. 1274
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the Napoleonic Code only adopted the trust in all its applications in 1964, but did so allowing the
individual to qualify. 81
Finally, other civil law jurisdictions adopting the trust and allowing the individual to qualify
have developed their trust laws either by directly appropriating a statute from a common law
jurisdiction or by relying on a common law advisor to draft their respective statute. Examples
include the Russian Federation where English and American law firms have been responsible for
drafting code provisions relating to the trust as part of an ongoing process of economic
privatization.82 In Ethiopia, draftspersons relied heavily on the English Trustee Act of 1925 in
creating the trust provisions of the Ethiopian civil code of 1960.83 Liechtenstein relied on the
English Trustee Act of 1925 to draft the Personen- und Gesellschaftsrecht which introduced the
trust or Treuhanderschaft.84, 85

(Can.); see also MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 287 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2000).
81
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1783 (2005); see also J.M. Wisdom, A Trust Code for the Civil Law,
Based on the Restatement and Uniform Acts, 13 TUL. L. REV. 79 (1938). The trust was originally
introduced in Louisiana in 1882 in the form of public interest (or charitable) trusts. The impetus
to the introduction of this legislation was to permit Paul Tulane to create an endowment for
Tulane University.
82
Sobranie aktov Prezidenta i Pravitelstva [Decree of President of Russian Federation],
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection
of Legislation] 1993, No. 2296, Item 1 § 6, para. 100 [hereinafter Decree No. 2296]. Note that
trust beneficiaries cannot be trustees under Decree No. 2296, which was followed by regulations
dated February 1st, 1994.
83
ETHIOPIAN CIVIL CODE OF 1960 §§ 516-537; see also Le Trust dans le code civil ethiopien,
Preface de Rene David (1975).
84
Liechtenstein, Personen-und Gesellschaftsrecht, 1926 (amended 1980), art. 897 (Liech.). In
1928, section 932a on Treuunternehmen, consisting of 170 articles, was added. See MAURIZIO
LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 280 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000); see also GUIDO
MEIER, LIECHTENSTEIN IN TRUSTS IN PRIME JURISDICTIONS 209 (2006) (“Treuhander (Trustee or
Salmann) im Sinne dieses Gesetzes is diejenige Einsel-person, Firma oder Verbandsperson . . .
.”).
85
Five civil law countries might be deemed outliers within the analysis promoted here. Four of
these non-conforming jurisdictions—Costa Rica, Argentina, Uruguay, and, outside Latin
America, China—permit the individual to qualify, even though none of these countries has been
colonized by a common law country or has ever been a semi-autonomous jurisdiction within a
common law country. Ley 24.441, art. 5, 9 Jan. 1995 (Arg.); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xintuo Fa [Trust Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by President, Apr. 28,
2001, effective Oct. 1, 2001) 74 ST. COUNCIL GAZ. 16 § 2, art. 24 (China), available at
http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-09/12/content_31194.htm; CODIGA DE COMMERCIALES §§
633-662 (Costa Rica); Ley Organica del Sistoma Bancario National, c. 10 (Costa Rica); Law No.
17703 (Nov. 26, 2003) (Uru.); see also MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 273
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). Further, with respect to these jurisdictions, there is no evidence
of a common law adviser nor is there evidence that any of these countries relied closely upon a
common law statute as they themselves attempted to draft legislation authorizing the trust.
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e. Appeal of the regulated trustee in civil law jurisdictions.
The frequent civil law requirement that the trustee be a regulated entity is noteworthy in light
of the longstanding distaste that the civil law has shown the trust. Recall that the political values
associated with the French Revolution and embedded in the Code Napoleon rendered the
common law trust anathema, a threat to the bourgeois republic that potentially allowed wealthy
landowners to circumvent aspects of the new property regime deemed integral to the new
order.86
If there are civil law jurisdictions that have now seen the utility of the trust, the requirement
that the trustee be a regulated entity suggests that these jurisdictions remain unprepared to
embrace the institution completely and that in fact they are prepared to forego some of the
inherent flexibility of the trust in order to constrain the uses to which it can be put. If the trust is
seen as potentially a way to avoid or indeed thwart essential elements of the civil law property
regime, subjection of trustees to a regulatory apparatus vests those authorities with enormous
power to constrain the settlor’s discretion by denying him a counter-party where trust terms
would otherwise circumvent fundamental norms.
Part III: Insights from the Common Law Reformation
While many civil law countries have been busy precluding the individual from qualifying
as trustee, the American academic bar has undertaken to reform the core doctrines that inform
the concept of the trust and govern fiduciary duty, but with seemingly scant attention to the
perquisites of fiduciary office.87 Although this literature has acknowledged the utility of the
professional trustee on prudential grounds (especially in light of the change in the typical modern
res from land to financial assets), this body of work contains no suggestion that the law should
constrain the settlor’s ultimate discretion in choosing an individual trustee, professional or
Finally, a fifth country, Japan, is non-conforming in ways that are the flip-side of the other four.
Even though Japan (like Liechtenstein and Ethiopia) relied on a common law statute to amend its
code to include the trust, Japan precludes the individual from qualifying and permits only banks
(six banks in particular) to serve. Shintako Ho [Trust Law], Law No. 62 of 1922 (Japan); see also
Japan, in INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAW, A219-A21.11.
86
See supra Part II.a.
87
The primary exponent of this movement has been Professor John Langbein, but others have
participated as well. See John Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment
Law, 59 MO. L. REV. 105 (1994); John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts,
105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995); John Langbein, The Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW.
U.L. REV. 1105 (2004); John Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument
of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997); John Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and
the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641 (1996). Other scholars involved in this
movement include Frank H. Easterbrook, Daniel R. Fischel, Robert H. Sitkoff, and Melanie B.
Leslie. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425 (1993); Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of
Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67 (2005); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 621 (2004).
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otherwise. The reason for this omission is clear upon consideration of the essential nature of the
trust that this movement explicitly promotes. But beyond the concerns for the contemporary
applications of the trust that are at the forefront of this movement, aspects of this literature
indicate more fundamental reasons that the common law has always taken a permissive posture
toward the individual trustee, reasons that go far beyond any contemporary requirements of the
institution. Like many movements advocating change, this literature is as much about renewal as
reform and what it advocates is at base the recovery and restoration of essential elements of the
authentic common law trust. As this literature points to those age-old elements of the institution,
it provides a window into deep normative biases in the common law understanding of property
that underpin and indeed require the continuing vitality of the individual trustee. In short, in this
literature the individual trustee remains an option – and an important one -- for reasons
consistent with the doctrine advocated and indeed the one recovered.
a. Trust as contract.
This recent American literature of reform has promoted a cluster of ideas, the most
important of which is that the trust is founded in contract. The trust is a “deal,” it is said, “a
bargain about how the trust assets are to be managed and distributed.” 88 This claim is offered as
the final sortie in a long-running battle concerning the fundamental nature of the trust – whether
it is a creature of contract or of property. The modern chapter in the controversy dates at least
from the era before the first Restatement of Trusts when the central figures were Frederic W.
Maitland, the great scholar of the common law, and Austin W. Scott, the author of the
Restatement. In his venerated lectures on Equity, Maitland allowed that the trust was in essence
a contract. As early as the 14th century, observed Maitland, when the English Chancellor began
to enforce the trust it was as “a contractual right, a right created by a promise.”89 Be this as it
may, however, several decades later, in 1917, Scott published an article in which, while
recognizing “that in the creation of a … trust there are often found all the elements … of a
contract,” 90 it is nevertheless the “undertaking” of fiduciary obligation and responsibility, Scott
maintained, that is the basis of the trust. “A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the
interest of another person” and whether the role emerges from the quid-pro-quo of the contract or
in a gratuitous act is immaterial. It is the presence of the role – with the set of attendant
obligations -- that matters. A trust exists when a trustee is in place and acting in the role – that
is, when the settlor has transferred to the trustee a res to manage subject to the requirements of
fiduciary responsibility. 91
As the author of the Restatement, Scott had the last word, at least until recent times. The
language of the first Restatement (published in 1935) in the ordinary course found its way into
the second Restatement (published in 1959) so that for many subsequent decades attorneys were
88

John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627
(1995). Equity interests would then arise as third-party beneficiaries of the contract.
89
FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 28-29, 110 (John Brunyate ed., rev.
ed., 2d ed. 1936) (A.H. Chaylor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1909). The beneficiary of the trust enters
as beneficiary of third-party-beneficiary contract.
90
Austin Wakefield Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 270 (1917).
91
Austin Wakefield Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 540-41 (1949).
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encouraged to take Scott’s view as authoritative. Throughout much of the twentieth century, in
common law jurisdictions the trust was taken as a matter of law to be founded in a transfer of
property subject to fiduciary duty. 92
In making the case that the trust is a bargain, the intent of this contemporary literature is
to cut the ground from Scott’s position and restore the advantage to Maitland once and for all.
But this recent literature of doctrinal reformation does not resurrect the colloquy between
Maitland and Scott and parse the elements of it in the mere pursuit of analytical integrity. At
base, in the modern literature, the question of the nature of the trust – whether it is a creature of
contract or of property – is important because it bears upon the requirement of particular terns –
terms that in the ascendancy of Scott were taken as necessary to the creation of the fiduciary
office and thus the trust itself.
An argument could be made that, in truth, the trust sits at the intersection between
contract and property, incorporating elements of both. That is to say, any trust will include
essentialist terms (a core list of fiduciary duties that are together constitutive of the office) as
well as other terms that are included as a matter of agreement between the parties. But for
purposes of this recent literature this solomonic view misses the point. With respect to any
particular trust provision, whether the analytical vector toggles toward “contract term” or
“property term” governs the amount of discretion the settlor has in including it in any given trust
agreement. If terms are essentialist, they are required if what results is to be a trust. If they are
not, then they are included at the discretion of the parties. By revisiting the disagreement
between Maitland and Scott and taking Maitland’s part, the modern literature lays the foundation
to secure broad discretion in the settlor for purposes of crafting trust terms.
b. Default rules.
That the objective of the contemporary literature is to free the hand of the settlor becomes
evident upon review of the second in the cluster of ideas promoted by the recent common law
literature. Closely allied to the idea that the trust is a contract is a second claim -- that virtually
all elements of fiduciary duty, components of the heretofore punctilio of honor, are simply
default rules. 93 Most of those elements of fiduciary duty previously deemed essential are not
required terms in any trust agreement. Rather, properly understood, these rules have the
normative status of terms in a hypothetical bargain, the agreed-upon objectives of a hypothetical
settlor and hypothetical trustee establishing a garden-variety trust.94 Because these elements of
92

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1935) states: “The creation of a trust is
conceived of as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as a
contract.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959) adds: “Although the trustee
by accepting the office of trustee subjects himself to the duties of administration, his duties are
not contractual in nature.” Note also the requirement of a res: “A trust cannot be created unless
there is trust property.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 74 (1959).
93

John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 628, 634
(1995).
94
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425
(1993).
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fiduciary duty are only default rules, settlors can opt out with respect to all terms except the most
minimal (for example, that the resultant agreement benefit the beneficiary). As a further
implication of the position that the trust is essentially a contract, the claim that most of the
historical components of fiduciary duty are default rules leaves enormous discretion in the hands
of the settlor in determining which terms are included – and which are not.
c. Civil law alignment.
The claim in this recent literature that the trust is a creature of contract would seem to align
the common law trust with the civil law model. 95 (We will return to the question of default rules
momentarily.) In civil law jurisdictions, core principles of property embedded in the civil law
courtesy of the French Revolution (such as unity of title) have meant that, if the trust was to be
introduced, it could not be conceived as a property institution but could only be understood to
arise by means of contract, one between the settlor and the trustee. Thus, in this common law
literature the effort to reinvigorate Maitland’s view of trust-as-contract would appear to draw the
common law alongside the civil law with respect to the conceptual foundation of the trust.
And other ideas promoted in this recent American literature would also seem to make the
common law trust of a piece with the new civil law version. For example, this literature seems to
announce a certain similarity between the two trusts – at least in this era -- with the claim that,
just as the civil law trust is in some jurisdictions used exclusively for commercial transactions,
the present day common law trust is commonly an investment vehicle. 96 Indeed, this literature
takes another step here and tries to raise the legal profile of what was previously only a bit-part
player in the annals of the common law -- the commercial trust, the form of the common law
trust that appears (as in civil law countries) in the quid-pro-quo of the marketplace. 97 But
further, this literature continues, pressing yet another point -- that, of late, even the intra-familial
donative trust, is, like the commercial trust, best understood as an entity operating in the stream
of commerce. No longer is the intra-familial trust born of paternalism, erected to conserve assets
and otherwise secure the fortunes of the vulnerable within the family, but this trust is now
commonly established to implement sophisticated tax strategies and holds a portfolio of complex
financial instruments.98 Once only an asset-conservation vehicle,99 the intra-familial trust is now
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John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995).
John Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment Law, AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. No. 1 (1976); see also John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an
Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997); John Langbein, The Uniform Prudent
Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641 (1996).
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This is also part of the legacy of Scott. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust:
The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 166 (1997).
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See Iris J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure a
Family Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 487-88 (2010).
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Until the late twentieth century, the trust and attendant fiduciary duties were formed on a
medieval model where the trust facilitated the conveyance of land within the family and the
fiduciary posture is one of risk-aversion. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1, 231, 237-38 (2d ed. 1898); see also
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 633 (1995);
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best understood like the commercial trust, as operating in the stream of commerce and taking
risks accordingly. Whether the common law trust is to be used for family financial purposes or
as a trust established purely as a vehicle in the marketplace, today the common law trust is likely
to be operating – like the civil law trust -- in the stream of commerce.
d. Settlors rule.
In claiming that the prototypical trust today is created to serve as an investment vehicle
operating in the stream of commerce, the common law literature of reform seeks to register a
paradigm shift. The law is no longer appropriately framed around the intra-familial donative
trust, the trust where historically the lack of parity between beneficiary and trustee justified
Scott’s rigorous view of fiduciary duty as an antidote to exploitation. Rather, the paradigmatic
common law trust is now an investment vehicle holding complex financial interests – perhaps
established for family reasons, perhaps to function in the larger marketplace – but in all events
operating in the stream of commerce. 100
This particular paradigm shift – registering a change both in the nature of the res and in what
is to be done with it -- might seem to herald a commensurate sea-change in thinking about the
fiduciary. A res of complex financial assets operating in the stream of commerce would seem to
call for regulations ex ante applicable to trustees, requirements for the office that would
potentially preclude the individual from qualifying. While this literature of reform recognizes
that, given the modern res, a professional trustee is a prudent choice, there is no suggestion here
that the law should stipulate criteria of fiduciary competence to govern the selection of trustees
ex ante or that the office should be restricted (as in many civil law countries) to regulated
entities.101 Indeed, rather than upping the ante for the would-be trustee, in this literature, the
location of the trust in the stream of commerce serves instead as yet another reason to attenuate
Scott’s view of the fiduciary role as born of vulnerability and entailing an unyielding set of
duties. So attenuated, the common law standards of fiduciary duty – and indeed the concept of
fiduciary duty itself – stand ready to be framed in the expectation that market mechanisms will
dissuade the fiduciary from most forms of opportunistic behavior. 102
The reason that this literature does not constrain the settlor’s discretion regarding the
individual trustee, paradigm shift notwithstanding, becomes evident upon placing this paradigm
shift alongside those other ideas promoted by the reform movement – that the trust is a creature
Stewart Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern Prudent Investor
Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2010).
100
See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce,
107 YALE L.J. 165, 166 (1997); see also Iris J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a
Family Trust Company to Secure a Family Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 488 (2010).
101
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 638-39
(1995).
102
This means that, for example, the long-embraced “no-further-inquiry rule,” the legal
undergirding of the previously sacrosanct proscription against trustee self-dealing readily gives
way to the standard for corporate directors and even this becomes a default rule. See Melanie B.
Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 79
(2005).
24

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1931018

of contract and that almost all rules of fiduciary duty are default rules. Taken alone with the
view that the trust is a contract, the claim that in these times the typical trust is most likely an
investment vehicle might appear to bring the common law trust alongside the civil law version.
But when taken together with the view of the trust as contract and fiduciary duty as largely
consisting of default rules, a profounder implication arises. It starts to appear that those ideas
promoted in the movement of doctrinal reform are calculated to free the settlor’s hand in shaping
trust terms and indeed in devising fiduciary duties appropriate to the specified terms.
If the settlor’s hand is to be free in any meaningful sense, however, he needs a willing
counter-party. The individual trustee continues to appeal because he is more likely to agree to
serve under a trust agreement incorporating innovative terms than is a corporate entity subject to
governmental regulation. Regulations are put in place to minimize risk to particular institutions
and to the entire financial services industry. Consequently, regulated trustees tend to be riskaverse and develop internal policies accordingly. Settlors can include cutting-edge terms, but in
deciding whether to serve under such instruments, regulated trustees often construe existing laws
against themselves, in the expectation that courts will continue to take the elements of fiduciary
duty as mandatory and impose upon them the draconian remedies that have been part and parcel
of the rigorous regime. And this reluctance often persists even where the trust agreement
explicitly releases the fiduciary from duties previously thought absolute.103
Ideas at the heart of this reformation suggest deep normative biases in the common law that
underpin the continued vitality of the individual trustee. The most important of these biases is a
willingness in the common law to tolerate – indeed to embrace -- the trust as a vehicle by which
a settlor, adopting innovative trust terms, can manipulate aspects of the property regime and
precipitate change. Indeed, during the period in which this literature of reformation has
appeared, settlors in the U.S. using the trust have produced a reconsideration of assumptions
underlying the recent movement to eliminate the rule against perpetuities. Until quite recently
this rule limiting the time horizon of a trust was thought a needless vestige of the era when the
typical trust asset was land and assets were rarely traded. Elimination of the rule was thought a
mark of progress – that is, until states started repealing it. Immediately upon its repeal, wealthy
settlors embraced the reform, establishing “Dynasty Trusts,” perpetual trusts that use the repeal
of the rule to avoid the transfer tax regime, creating family endowments of a magnitude and
permanence that they potentially jeopardize the rough equality that is a background condition to
healthy democracy. 104 The advent of the Dynasty Trust has summoned the academic bar to
reconsider the rule and, rather than advocate its repeal, recognize anew the reasons to limit the
time horizon of trusts.105
That the trust is a catalyst to legal change is not a new idea. In fact, the trust was born as a
catalyst to change, a point not overlooked by Maitland:
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Feudalism had ceased to be useful, it had become a system of capricious exactions
– it was very natural and not dishonourable that men should attempt to free
themselves from the burdens or reliefs and wardships and marriages, from the
terribly severe law of forfeiture and escheat for crime, that they should wish to
make wills of land or go very near to making them.106
Maitland clearly views the trust here as a progressive instrument, a tool where outmoded
elements of the legal regime could be circumvented. Of course, the impetus at work here –
settlors seeking to avoid inconvenient or unprofitable aspects of the law – is the same agency that
was in play in the substitution fiduciaire, a device the French viewed as thwarting fundamental
principles of justice. The question is whether the trust – the instrumentality to which the
common law has long given quarter -- is ultimately a progressive instrument or a reactionary
one. As with most libertarian agencies, the exercise of individual discretion produces outcomes
that are as difficult to predict as they are hard to control. Settlor’s discretion is effectively a wild
card and, whether in any given circumstance it serves progressive or reactionary purposes, turns
on where this agency falls on the arc of history.
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